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Fragmentation of Liberal Parties in Russia 
Party development in post-communist Russia has been 
highly disorganized. The chaotic formation, dissolution, 
and reformation of parties that has been so characteristic 
of the past decade has its roots in several aspects of 
Russian politics. First and most basically, the structure 
of Russia's national government and its electoral process 
are not conducive to a coherent party system. The way in 
which political parties form and develop are extensively 
shaped by the government in which they operate, and 
Russia's system of government has had a negative effect on 
the strength of its parties. Party development has also 
faced challenges from taking place after the fall of a 
long-standing oppressive regime, in terms of both the 
mentality of voters and politicians and the political 
climate in which parties began to form. One lingering 
problem in the party system that is beginning to take shape 
is that of coordination among like-minded parties. Parties 
with similar ideologies have conSistently competed against 
one another in elections, often leading to outcomes based 
on which ideologies are represented by the fewest parties, 
rather than which ones are supported by the most voters. 
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The current structure of Russian government was 
created by the Constitution of 1993. This constitution 
gave extensive powers to the president. The president was 
to be commander-in-chief of the armed forces, would preside 
over the security council, and have the power to declare 
marshal law. The prime minister was to be appointed by the 
president and confirmed by the parliament; however, the 
president was given the authority to dissolve the 
parliament if it failed to confirm his appointee on three 
consecutive occasions. There was also no requirement that 
the prime minister be a member of parliament or belong to 
one of the parties represented in the parliament, and the 
prime minister could be dismissed by the president at any 
time without parliamentary approval. The president was 
also responsible for appointing and dismissing deputy prime 
~inisters, and required only the consent of the prime 
minister to appoint and dismiss other members of the 
~overrumefit. The president eould veto le~islatiofi that was 
passed by the parliament, but a presidential veto could be 
overridden by a two-thirds majority in each house of the 
legislature. The constitution did give the parliament the 
power to impeach the president; however, the procedures for 
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impeachment were complex and difficult, and could only be 
initiated in the most extreme circumstances. l 
The constitution allowed the president to serve for a 
maximum of two consecutive four-year terms. The president 
was to be directly elected in an election separate from the 
legislative elections. The president also had to be 
elected by a majority of those who voted in the election; 
if no candidate received greater than fifty percent of the 
vote in the first round of voting, there would be a run-off 
election between the two candidates receiving the greatest 
number of votes. 2 
The legislative branch created by the 1993 
Constitution was called the Federal Assembly. It consisted 
of an upper house, the Federation Council, and a lower 
house, called the Duma. The powers of the Federation 
Council included approval of boundary changes, appointment 
of judges to the Supreme Court upon nomination by the 
president, and authorization of the use of armed forces 
outside the boundaries of the state. It also considered 
legislation proposed by the Duma on matters of taxes and 
currency, the budget, international treaties, and war and 
peace. It met irregularly, for one week out of every 
I Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and SOciety, 3rd ed. (New York: Routeledge, 2002), 104. 
2 Christopher Marsh, Rusia at the Polls. (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 2002), 59. 
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three, with an additional period before these sessions for 
committee meetings. 3 
The Federation Council consists of 178 members, or two 
from each of the eighty-nine subjects of the Russian 
Federation. Members of the council were elected by a 
majoritarian method in two-member districts, with each 
voter casting two votes and the top two candidates in each 
district receiving seats. This method was only used for 
the 1993 elections, however, and the Federation Council has 
been indirectly elected by regional governors and 
legislatures in all subsequent elections. 4 
The lower house of the Federal Assembly is the State 
Duma. Its powers include the approval of the president's 
nomination for prime minister, although failure to approve 
the nominee three consecutive times makes the president 
constitutionally required to appoint his own candidate for 
prime minister, dissolve the Duma, and call new elections. 
The Duma also has the authority to declare its lack of 
confidence in the government as a whole; however, doing so 
twice within three months would also result in the 
dissolution of the Duma. 5 The Duma is also responsible for 
confirmation to and dismissal from certain positions, such 
3 Sakwa, 133. 
4 Sakwa, 134. 
S Stephen White, Russia's New Politics: The Management of a Postcommunist SoCiety (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 64. 
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as Chairman of the State Bank, Chairman of the Accounting 
Chamber, and Commissioner on Human Rights. 6 It adopts 
federal legislation, which must be approved by the 
Federation Council, but it can override a rejection with a 
two-thirds majority on a second vote. After this process, 
legislation is still subject to presidential approval.? 
The Duma is composed of 450 members, half of which are 
elected in single-member districts, and the other half of 
which are elected through a proportional representation 
party list system. Members are elected to four-year terms, 
in elections held the year before presidential elections. 
Candidates in single-member districts need only a plurality 
of the votes to be elected. In the party list races, 
parties must win at least five percent of the vote in order 
to receive seats in the Duma; the seats are then assigned 
to individual members based on their ranking on the party 
list, i.e., the higher a candidate is on the list, the more 
likely he or she is to receive a seat. Votes cast for 
parties that receive less than five percent of the vote are 
redistributed to the winning parties based on the 
percentage of the votes each received. 8 
6 White, 65. 
7 Sakwa, 128. 
8 Marsh, 60. 
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One of the first problems the constitution adopted in 
1993 presented to party development in Russia was the fact 
that it wasn't adopted until 1993. A major stimulus for 
the development of parties and a party system is the 
electoral process itself. 9 After the fall of the Soviet 
Union in August 1991, it was over two years before Russia 
held a general election. Until the adoption of the new 
constitution in 1993, parties didn't even have an electoral 
system to work with, much less an election to begin 
campaigning for. 
Development of political parties also depends on the 
parties' base in the legislature. lo With no new elections 
held between August 1991 and December 1993, the parties 
that were forming had no such base to work with. The 
legislature was still composed of the old USSR Congress of 
Peoples' Deputies, who had no links to the new parties and 
were in no way accountable to them.II 
The Constitution of 1993 also hindered party 
development because of the circumstances under which it was 
adopted. When elections to the state Duma were finally 
held in December 1993, conditions were less than favorable 
9 Robert A. Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1966),349. 
10 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, trans. by 
Barbara and Robert North (London: Methuen, 1959), 183. 
11 Sakwa, 176. 
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for running a campaign due to the military action taken 
against parliament three months earlier. The constitution 
was finally passed after a long stand-off between President 
Boris Yeltsin and the parliament that existed at the time 
under the old Soviet constitution. Both the president and 
the parliament had proposed drafts for a new constitution, 
with the presidential draft creating a strong presidential 
system and the parliament's draft providing for significant 
legislative checks on the president's power. 12 Neither side 
was willing to compromise, and in order to end the 
stalemate President Yeltsin dissolved the parliament in 
contradiction to the existing constitution. In response, 
members of parliament barricaded themselves inside the 
legislative building and the head of parliament, Aleksandr 
Rutskoi, declared himself acting president. After a 
deadlock lasting nearly two weeks, Yeltsin ordered military 
action against the parliament, Rutskoi and his supporters 
were arrested, and Yeltsin was free to introduce a 
constitution creating a strong presidential system. 13 This 
chain of events created circumstances for the parliamentary 
elections three months later that were hostile to party 
activity and a healthy campaign. 
12 Marsh, 55-56. 
13 White, 35. 
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The party system in Russia also struggles because of 
the power of the president in Russian government. Neither 
Boris Yeltsin nor Vladimir Putin ever officially joined a 
political party, and Yeltsin actively promoted an image of 
being ~above" partisan politics. 14 With the resources 
available to a sitting president, the incumbent in a 
presidential race doesn't need the support of a party to 
win reelection. 15 Since a presidential election has not yet 
been contested in Russia without an incumbent, partisan 
candidates have always been at a disadvantage in these 
races. With the disparity in power between the president 
and the legislature, Duma elections may seem relatively 
unimportant. This fact combined with a presidency that has 
eschewed association with political parties reduces the 
effect voters think they can have on government by 
supporting a political party. 
Another major cause of the weakness of Russian 
political parties comes from their formation in a declining 
communist regime. The development of a legal multi-party 
system in Russia began with the amendment of the Soviet 
constitution in 1990 to allow the existence of parties 
other than the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). 
14 Timothy J. Colton, Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the New Russia 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), lOS. 
15 White, 97. 
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Article 6 of the constitution, which had officially 
recognized the CPSU as the "leading and guiding force of 
Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system, of 
all state organizations and public organizations" was 
amended to read "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
and other political parties, as well as trade union, youth, 
and other public organizations and mass movements, 
participate in shaping the policies of the Soviet state and 
in running state and public affairs through their 
representatives elected to the soviets of people's deputies 
and in other ways."16 The constitution was also revised to 
include Article 51, which expressly stated that citizens 
had the right to "unite in political parties and public 
organizations and to participate in mass movements 
contributing to their greater political activity and to the 
satisfaction of their diverse interests."17 
With a legal framework for their existence in place, a 
large number of parties began to emerge. By the end of 
1990, there were over 450 political organizations in 
Russia,18 and by August 1991, almost one hundred of these 
had developed into recognizable political parties, although 
16 White, 36. 
17 White, 36. 
18 Sakwa, 174. 
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many had only a few hundred members and few had members in 
the Soviet republics outside Russia. 19 
Many of the parties that emerged at this time were 
able to achieve success as parties of opposition to the 
CPSU. By campaigning on negative platforms based solely on 
opposition to the communist regime, parties were able to 
exploit the CPSU's unpopularity to win victories with a 
minimum of organizational or intellectual resources. 20 The 
parties had no need to develop a positive program or define 
a clear ideological position of their own. The consequence 
of this type of development was that the resulting parties 
were organizationally and ideologically weak. The parties 
that developed in these circumstances were characterized 
by: 
"numerical weakness, weak and amorphous organizational 
structures (particularly at the local level), regionalism, 
ideological vagueness and a negativism bordering on 
populism, and low-caliber leaders who, for the sake of 
self-affirmation, actively set themselves up against other 
parties, even ones that were ideologically close to them."21 
Once the CPSU was no longer a power, parties could not 
exist solely as opposition to it, and had to develop 
19 Sakwa, 174. 
20 Sakwa, 175. 
21 Vyacheslav Nikonov, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 7 August 1992, P 5, quoted in Richard Sakwa, Russian 
Politics and Society, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2002), 175. 
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platforms beyond just a vague support for democracy. The 
already numerous parties began dividing over conflicting 
viewpoints on political, economic, and nationality policy. 
The absence of the CPSU removed the incentive for parties 
opposed to it to unite, and the parties became polarized 
not only because of divergent programs, but also because of 
the ~irreconcilable" style of politics, in which any 
difference in issue stances became a barrier to cooperation 
between parties, that became the standard for most 
parties. 22 
Another legacy of the Soviet Union's one-party system 
was the stigma surrounding the word "party" in Russia, 
where the only concept that most people had of a political 
party was the old CPSU. For this reason many parties in 
Russia prefer to be called ~electoral blocs" or ~public 
associations," and many voters still remain wary of joining 
a party. 23 
Russia's party system also faced unusual fragmentation 
because of its sudden development. In an established party 
system, when small parties develop and gather support, they 
are usually absorbed by one of the larger, established 
parties who add the smaller party's issues to their 
22 Sakwa, 176. 
23 White, 36. 
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platform. 24 New concerns and constituencies thus become 
represented by the major parties in government. In Russia, 
a party for every possible interest and segment of society 
developed at the same time and on equal footing, which led 
to a chaotic plethora of parties rather than the gradual 
additions to major parties that smaller parties usually 
become. Without the larger established parties, the small 
parties continue to exist on their own, competing with 
other small parties that may be ideologically similar to 
them. 
Another weakness of Russian political parties is that 
they are frequently built around the personality of their 
leaders, rather than around clear issue stances or 
ideological viewpoints. Without firmly established 
reputations, party leaders are usually the clearest 
association voters can make with a given party. In fact, 
parties are colloquially referred to by the names of their 
leaders, such as "the party of Zhirinovsky" for LDPR, or 
"the party of Yavlinsky" for Yabloko. 25 Personality basis 
presents several problems for a party. Obviously, when a 
party is based entirely on one person's leadership, the 
party's very existence is tenuous because the leader could 
24 Duverger, 290. 
25 Colton, 174-175. 
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die, retire, or leave the party for some other reason. 
Also, focusing attention on personality detracts from the 
development of a clear and stable ideology and issue 
platform that would provide a lasting foundation for the 
party. 
The political parties that have developed in Russia 
since the fall of the Soviet Union can be grouped into four 
broad ideological families: communist, right-wing 
nationalist~ pro-government center, and liberal reformista 26 
The communist parties consist mainly of former members 
of the CPSU. When the CPSU was officially banned in 1992, 
several successor parties had already begun to form. Most 
of these parties, including the Socialist Party of Working 
People (SPWP) and the Union of Communists, combined to form 
the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), which 
claims to be the official successor party to the CPSU. 
Some extremist communist parties refused to join the CPRF, 
such as the Russian Communist Workers' Party (RCWP) and the 
All-Union Communist Workers' Party (UKPB), which refused to 
recognize the 1993 constitution and therefore took no part 
in elections. 27 Even without the support o·f these extremist 
parties, the CPRF became the largest party in Russia, with 
26 White, 42. 
27 Sakwa, 179. 
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a membership of over 500,000. 28 One other major communist 
party, the Agrarian Party, remained independent, but 
functioned primarily as a rural branch of the CPRF. 29 
Parties in the right-wing nationalist group varied 
somewhat in terms of both ideology and level of extremism. 
One of the most radical was the National Salvation Front 
(NSF), which was declared unconstitutional by Boris Yeltsin 
in October of 1992, but was reinstated by the 
Constitutional Court in February 1993. The NSF then became 
one of the leaders of the military resistance to the 
dissolution of parliament in September and October of 1993, 
and was one of several parties to be banned from the 1993 
Duma elections. The only nationalist party that did not 
participate in the conflict, and therefore the only 
nationalist party remaining at the time of the December 
elections, was the obviously misnamed Liberal Democratic 
Party of Russia (LDPR). 30 
The LDPR is one of the best examples of a political 
party based on the personality of its leader. The founder 
of the Liberal Democrats, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, was a 
charismatic campaigner who drew attention to himself and 
his party with outlandishly nationalistic proposals, such 
28 Sakwa, 179. 
29 Marsh, 65. 
30 Sakwa, 177-178. 
Page 15 
as the restoration of the Russian empire to encompass not 
only the former Soviet Union, but also the entirety of the 
former Tsarist empire, including Poland, Finland, and 
Alaska. 31 In 1994, the Liberal Democrats added "the party 
of Zhirinovsky" to their official name, and named 
Zhirinovksy as chairman for life with the right to form the 
party leadership any way he chose. 32 
Although the ban on the nationalist parties that 
participated in the confrontation between the president and 
parliament in 1993 left LDPR the only nationalist party 
eligible to contest that year's election, others were soon 
to emerge. Most notably, Derzhava(Great Power) led by 
former vice-president Aleksandr Rutskoi, and the Congress 
of Russian Communities, led by Yuri Skokov and Alekasandr 
Lebed, competed with LDPR for the nationalist vote in 1995 
and 1999,33 but the Liberal Democrats remain by far the 
largest and most successful of the nationalist parties. 
The third grouping consists of pro-government centrist 
parties. While the Russian president has never officially 
joined a political party, parties have formed during each 
Duma election with the purpose of supporting the policies 
of the president and the presidentially appointed prime 
31 Sakwa, 178. 
32 White, 48. 
33 Marsh, 79. 
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minister. In 1993, the leading party of presidential 
support was Russia's Choice, led by Yegor Gaidar. 34 Before 
the 1995 election, Viktor Chernomyrdin founded Our Home is 
Russia (Nash Dom -- Rossiya, or NOR), to be the new party 
of government support. Many members of Russia's Choice 
left the party to join NOR, and Yegor Gaidar rebuilt the 
party as Russia's Democratic Choice and moved toward a 
liberal reformist platform. NOR espoused a vague program 
supporting the further development of democracy, a market 
economy, and stability, and lost its status as the "party 
of power" when Chernomyrdin was dismissed as prime minister 
in 1998. 35 For the 1999 elections, the new pro-government 
party was the Interregional Movement Unity, commonly known 
as "Unity" or by its Russian acronym "Medved." This party 
received explicit support from Prime Minister Vladimir 
Putin, but was headed by leaders with limited political 
exposure. 36 In addition to the officially acknowledged 
"party of power," other parties developed with a platform 
of supporting the presidential government. Women of 
Russia, which has competed in all three Duma elections, set 
itself up as a kind of "women's branch" of the leading pro-
34 Marsh, 77. 
35 White, 45. 
36 Marsh, 88. 
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government party,3? supporting the president's policies with 
the additional objective of electing women to the Duma. In 
1999, Fatherland - All Russia (Otechestvo - Vsya Rossiya, 
or OVR) , developed as an alternative pro-government party, 
which had support among members of regional governments. 
While OVR was not endorsed by Yeltsin or Putin( it did 
support the policies they proposed. 38 
The final group is composed of liberal reformist 
parties. The largest of these parties, and the only one 
that has contested all three Duma elections, is Yabloko. 
The name "Yabloko," which means "Apple" in Russian, is an 
abbreviation of the names of the party's three founders, 
Grigory Yavlinsky, Yuri Boldyrev, and Vladimir Lukin. 
Yabloko was extremely critical of the Yeltsin government, 
and it has cultivated an image as "the only democratic 
alternative to the current regime.,,39 The remainder of 
Russia's liberal reformists have presented a constantly 
changing stream of somewhat chaotic parties, ranging from a 
handful of parties in the 1993 election to the outrageous 
number that competed in the 1995 election. By the 1999 
election most of these parties had joined to form the Union 
37 White, 45. 
38 Sakwa, 157. 
39 White, 43. 
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of Rightist Forces (Soyuz Pravikh Sil, or SPS), and were 
able to run a more efficient campaign. 4o 
The first electoral test of these parties came in the 
Duma elections of December 1993. Due to the executive-
legislative standoff that had ended with military action 
that October, conditions were less than ideal for 
contesting an election. The leading critics of Yeltsin's 
government, Ruslan Khasbulatov and Aleksandr Rustskoi, 
remained in prison for their resistance to the dissolution 
of parliament. Sixteen political parties had been banned 
on the grounds that they had been involved in the 
confrontation, including the National Salvation Front 
(NSF)and the Russian Communist Workers' Party (RCWP).41 The 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) was 
eventually legalized and allowed to take part in the 
December elections, but the ban remained on most of the 
others. Eighteen newspapers were banned or suspended, 
including Pravda and Sovetskaya Gazeta, which were required 
to replace their editors before their suspensions could be 
lifted, and the parliament's newspaper, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 
which was overtaken altogether by the Russian government. 42 
Until October 18, a curfew was enforced and a ban remained 
40 Marsh, 91. 
41 White, 38. 
42 White, 38. 
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in place on public rallies and demonstrations,43 which made 
campaigning almost impossible. 
The ban on public rallies also presented parties with 
difficulties in simply qualifying for the ballot. The Duma 
elections had been announced on September 21, but whether 
or not they would actually take place remained uncertain 
until the executive-legislative stalemate ended on October 
4. In order to be placed on the ballot, each party was 
required to collect 100,000 signatures from across several 
regions and register with the Central Election Commission 
by November 6. 44 The task of collecting the signatures in 
such little time was difficult for parties that had yet to 
form strong organizational structures, and was made even 
more difficult by the fact that during almost half of that 
time it was illegal to hold a rally for the party's 
supporters. 
Out of over one hundred parties and electoral blocs 
that had formed or were forming in the months before the 
1993 elections, thirty-five attempted to qualify for the 
ballot. Twenty-one presented the CEC with the required 
number of signatures, but eight of these failed to qualify 
due to irregularities in the signature lists and 
43 Marsh, 62. 
44 Marsh, 63. 
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accompanying documentation. In all, thirteen parties were 
placed on the ballot for the party list election. 45 
Eight parties passed the five percent threshold 
required to win Duma seats in the party list race. The 
nationalist LDPR won the most votes of any single party, 
with 22.9 percent of the vote and fifty-nine party list 
seats. Three pro-government parties cleared the five 
percent threshold: Russia's Choice with 15.5 percent of the 
vote and forty party list seats, Women of Russia with 8.1 
percent of the vote and twenty-one party list seats, and 
the Democratic Party of Russia with 5.5 percent of the vote 
and fourteen party list seats. The two communist parties 
on the ballot both received more than five percent of the 
vote, with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation 
(CPRF) winning 12.4 percent and thirty-two party list 
seats, and the Agrarian party winning 7.9 percent and 
twenty-one party list seats. Of the liberal reformist 
parties, the Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES) won 
6.8 percent of the vote and eighteen party list seats, and 
Yabloko won 7.9 percent of the vote and twenty party list 
seats. A total of 13 percent of the vote was cast either 
45 Marsh, 63. 
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for parties that failed to pass the five percent threshold 
or for the option of "against all parties. ff46 
The majority of the district races were won by 
independent candidates (136 out of 229). The most 
successful party in the district races was Russia's Choice, 
winning twenty-five seats, and most other parties won at 
least one single-member district seat. Of the thirteen 
parties on the ballot for the proportional representation 
race, the only one that failed to win a single seat in the 
Duma was the Constructive Ecological Movement of Russia 
(CEDR) .47 
Procedures for registering for the ballot were changed 
somewhat between the 1993 and 1995 Duma elections by the 
Electoral Law of 1995. The biggest change was in the 
number of signatures required to be placed on the ballot. 
The required number was raised from 100,000 to 200,000, and 
no more than seven percent of the signatures could come 
from anyone region. 48 Despite the more stringent 
requirements, the party list race in 1995 included more 
than three times as many parties as in 1993. According to 
the Central Electoral Commission {CEC), there were 273 
groups that qualified as "political parties" or "electoral 
46 Marsh, 67. 
47 Marsh, 69. 
48 Marsh, 73. 
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organizations" and therefore had the right to attempt to be 
placed on the party list ballot. 49 By May 1995, seventy-
nine parties had been registered by the Ministry of Justice 
to participate in the elections, and after the process of 
collecting and authenticating signatures was complete, the 
ballot listed a total of forty-three parties. 5o 
Out of the forty-three parties on the ballot in 1995, 
only four passed the five percent threshold to receive 
seats in the Duma. The CPRF was the top finisher, with 
22.3 percent of the vote and ninety-nine party list seats, 
followed by the LDPR with 11.2 percent of the vote and 
fifty party list seats, Our Home is Russia with 10.1 
percent and forty-five seats, and Yabloko with 6.9 percent 
of the vote and thirty-one party list seats. Together, 
these four parties received just over fifty percent of the 
vote, which means that almost half of the votes cast in the 
party list race went to parties that won no proportional 
representation seats. Many people perceived these votes to 
be ~wasted," and some even challenged the legitimacy of the 
elections. Particularly unhappy with the outcome were the 
parties that came within a few tenths of a percentage point 
of clearing the threshold, such as Women of Russia with 4.6 
49 White, 39. 
50 Sakwa, 181. 
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percent of the vote, and the Congress of Russian 
Communities with 4.3 percent. 51 
The Communist Party was also the most successful party 
in the district races. With fifty-eight seats, the CPRF 
won almost three times as many of these elections as did 
its closest competitor - its fellow communist Agrarian 
Party, which won twenty seats. With wins in seventy-seven 
of the single-member district races, the independent 
candidates were again more successful than any single 
party; unlike 1993, however they didn't win a majority of 
these races, as 148 seats went to candidates nominated by a 
party. Other parties that did well in the district races 
included Yabloko, with fourteen seats, Our Horne is Russia 
with ten, and Russia's Democratic Choice and Power to the 
People with nine seats each. 52 
Although most won only one single member district 
seat, a total of twenty-three parties received some 
representation in the Duma. 53 That smaller parties would 
have a better chance at winning single-member district 
races than proportional representation seats in an election 
with so many parties seems contrary to conventional wisdom. 
In most cases, these parties won only one seat, which was 
S'Marsh, 82-83. 
52 White, 52. 
S3 Marsh, 83. 
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from the district where the party's leader was competing. 54 
This is a result of the tendency of parties to form around 
a charismatic leader with personal political ambitions and 
strong local support, rather than around a platform or 
ideology that could develop a nation-wide following. 
The success of the Communist Party in the 1995 Duma 
elections was commonly attributed to the voters' 
dissatisfaction with existing conditions,55 but the 
difference in electoral results between communist and 
liberal parties can be better explained by differences in 
organization and coordination. While many voters did 
express their dissatisfaction by voting for the CPRF, just 
as many if not more voted for liberal reform parties. 
Including "wasted" votes, the total number of votes 
received by liberal reformist parties amounted to almost 
thirty percent, roughly equal to the combined total of the 
communist parties. 56 
Lack of coordination also played a role in the 
Communist victories in the district races. Although there 
were tentative agreements among some of the major parties 
within each ideological grouping not to oppose one another 
in some districts, in most districts party nominees found 
54 White, 52. 
5S Marsh, 86. 
56 Marsh. 83. 
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themselves competing against candidates from like-minded 
parties. This was particularly true for the liberals, who 
faced competition from numerous small parties as well as 
the major parties that made attempts at coordination. In 
districts where support for liberal parties was strongest, 
such as those in Moscow and St. Petersburg, as many as six 
or seven liberal candidates competed against each other for 
the single-member district seat. 57 
In addition to the victories by the CPRF in 1995 that 
were largely attributable to their superior organization, 
the LDPR could also credit its success in 1993 to the 
consolidation of like-minded voters. After the other 
nationalist parties were banned for their participation in 
the parliament's resistance to dissolution, the LDPR was 
left as the only party for which supporters of a 
nationalist ideology could vote. 58 Taken as a whole, each 
of the other groupings - communist, pro-government, and 
liberal -- won roughly the same percentage of the vote. 59 
The results in 1993 were not as shockingly disproportionate 
to the actual votes received, because with a significantly 
lower number of parties to split like-minded voters, a 
greater number of parties representing a greater percentage 
57 Sakwa, 182. 
58 White, 38. 
59 Marsh, 67. 
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of the vote were able to clear the five percent threshold. 
The results of both the 1993 and 1995 Duma elections 
clearly demonstrated the need for Russia's numerous 
political parties to consolidate. 
Recognizing the benefits of consolidation, several 
parties have made attempts at working together. One of the 
earliest was a government-sponsored plan to create a two-
party system before the 1995 elections. The idea was to 
unite right-center parties into one bloc, which would be 
led by Viktor Chernomyrdin, and to combine the left-center 
parties into another bloc, to be led by Ivan Rybkin. Both 
groups faced problems with parties that were unwilling to 
join and defections after the blocs had formed. The left-
center bloc never really got off the ground, and the right-
center bloc splintered and its remains became the pro-
government party Our Home is Russia (NDR) .60 
Attempts have also been made to coordinate the 
supporters of ideologically similar presidential 
candidates. When the 1996 presidential election appeared 
to be a race between the incumbent Boris Yeltsin and the 
leader of the Communist Party, Gennady Zyuganov, several 
liberal and centrist candidates dropped out of the race and 
endorsed Yeltsin in order to avoid a split of the vote like 
60 Sakwa, 181. 
Page 27 
the one that led to the CPRF's victory in 1995. 61 The 
leading liberal candidate who refused to support Yeltsin 
was Grigory Yavlinsky, one of the founders of Yabloko, and 
one of the liberal politicians who had been most critical 
of Yeltsin and his policies. Despite Yeltsin openly 
courting an alliance in the hope of gaining the seven to 
ten percent of the voters that opinion polls showed as 
supporting Yavlinsky,62 Yavlinsky remained in the race, 
ultimately receiving 7.3 percent of the vote and not 
significantly interfering with the eventual reelection of 
Yelstin. 63 
A more successful attempt at party cooperation was the 
creation of the Union of Rightist Forces (SPS), a 
collaboration of liberal parties for the 1999 election. By 
consolidating the support of most of the smaller liberal 
parties that had contested the 1995 election, the SPS was 
able to win 8.5 percent of the party list vote, thus 
clearing the five percent threshold and earning twenty-four 
seats in the Duma. 64 Again, the holdout among the liberals 
was Yabloko, which was left as the only serious liberal 
competitor for SPS. Yabloko finished behind SPS in the 
61 "Rillisia's Power Puzzle," The Econornfs't wI. 339 (1996): 49. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Marsh, 106. 
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1999 election, barely clearing the threshold with 5.93 
percent of the vote and sixteen seats. 65 
The 1999 elections as a whole showed a significant 
improvement in party consolidation. A total of twenty-six 
parties competed in the party list race,66 which was a 
considerable reduction from the forty-three parties that 
competed in 1995. More changes were made between 1995 and 
1999 in the procedure for being registered for the party 
list ballot. Parties could still qualify by submitting 
200,000 signatures with no more than seven percent coming 
from anyone region, as they had done in 1995. To register 
for the 1999 ballot, however, there was the added option of 
paying an electoral deposit of 25,000 times the minimum 
wage, which amounted to approximately 80,000 US dollars. 
seventeen of the twenty-six parties were placed on the 
ballot in this manner. 67 
Other changes included measures taken by the Central 
Electoral Commission to prevent such a large number of 
parties from entering the race. New provisions in the 
electoral law provided that parties who registered by 
paying an electoral deposit and failed to receive at least 
three percent of the vote would not get their deposits 
6S Marsh. 92. 
66 Marsh. 87. 
67 Marsh, 87. 
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back. Also, parties that received less than two percent of 
the vote would have to repay the CEC funds that were 
allocated to them during the campaign and repay the media 
for the free airtime they were given. 68 These measures 
provided a deterrent to smaller parties that were unlikely 
to be able to meet the minimums, and provided an incentive 
for parties to consolidate to increase their chances of 
meeting the minimums, or at least to share the financial 
burdens in the event of failure. 
The results of the 1999 elections were considerably 
more reflective of the votes cast than in 1995. Six 
parties surpassed the five percent threshold, and their 
combined totals amounted to more than eighty-one percent of 
the vote. The CPRF was again the top finisher, with 24.29 
per Gent of the vote. This was an increase Qf almost two 
percentage points from 1995, but because there were so many 
fewer "wastedU votes to be redistributed to the top 
finishers, the number of party list seats the CPRF received 
fell from ninety-nine to sixty-seven. The second place 
finisher was the new pro-government party, Unity, with 
23.32 percent of the vote and sixty-four seats. The other 
four parties to enter the Duma from the party lists were 
Yabloko and SPS, as mentioned above; Zhironovsky's Bloc 
68 Marsh, 97. 
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(the new name of the LDPR) with 5.98 percent of the vote 
and 17 party list seats; and the regionally based pro-
government party Fatherland - All Russia (OVR) with 13.32 
percent of the vote for thirty-seven party list seats. 69 
All seventeen parties that paid an electoral deposit to be 
placed on the ballot failed to win the three percent of the 
vote required in order to have the deposit returned to 
them. A total of eighteen parties received fewer than two 
percent and had to repay the CEC and broadcast media for 
their support during the campaign. 7o 
The success of the SPS in the 1999 election and the 
decline in support for Yabloko from 1995 led to attempts by 
the two parties to coordinate their efforts in future 
elections. The dramatic difference in the electoral 
failure of the highly fragmented liberal parties in the 
1995 election and the success of mostly the same parties 
consolidated under the umbrella of the SPS in 1999 would 
seem to illustrate the benefits of cooperation. The 
incentive to work together should be even greater because 
of a general trend in the support for liberal parties 
shifting to the pro-government center since the 1999 
election, which puts both parties in danger of not clearing 
69 White, 92. 
70 Marsh, 97. 
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the five percent barrier in 2003. 71 In spite of this, 
attempts at an alliance have thus far been unsuccessful. 
There are several possible reasons for Yabloko's 
pervasive resistance to joining or collaborating with other 
parties. Many of these reasons are the same ones that have 
hindered the coordinated development of Russia's party 
system as a whole. The most obvious reason sterns from the 
strongly presidential system of government. Yabloko's 
leader, Grigory Yavlinsky, was a serious candidate in both 
the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections, and it seems 
unlikely that he would be willing to give up his candidacy 
in future elections by joining with another party that 
might want to nominate its own candidate. Because of the 
disproportionate power of the president compared to the 
legislature, Yavlinsky may view the potential sacrifice of 
success in the Duma election to be worth the guarantee of a 
nomination in the presidential race. 
The effects of years of one-party rule may also play a 
factor in Yabloko's refusal to combine with another party. 
Over the past decade, Yabloko has consistently taken a 
position of staunch opposition to the government and has 
been known for its refusal to compromise its positions in 
71 Andrei Ryabov, "Yabloko and the Vacuum," http://www.eng.yabloko.rulPubIl2002/papers/vek-
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order to cooperate with other parties. This ideological 
absolutism may be the result of decades where no political 
compromise was possible, and opposition to the government 
was something that was longed for but impossible. In the 
first years of Russian electoral politics, Yabloko enjoyed 
its image as ~the one democratic alternative to the current 
regime," and it may be unwilling to let go of its 
reputation as a government antagonist by alligning itself 
with the more government-friendly SPS. 
Party politics in post-Soviet Russia have been 
characterized by a lack of cohesion and a failure by most 
parties to organize and campaign effectively. Several 
factors, which have their underlying causes in the effects 
of Soviet rule and the government system that was adopted 
in its wake, have presented challenges to developing 
parties from their very beginning. While the highly 
fragmented Russian parties seem to be making gradual 
progress towards a more cohesive and functional party 
system, some of the same factors responsible for the 
initial chaos are still causing problems for attempts at 
further consolidation. 
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